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Michael Fischer
STANLEY CAVELL AND CRITICIZING 
THE UNIVERSITY FROM WITHIN
Stanley Cavell has spoken often of his “lifelong quarrel with the profession of philosophy” but he has said less about the university 
as a whole and its pressures on all academic disciplines, philosophy 
included.1 In Cavell’s work, “academic” or “professional” philosophy 
takes shape in an institutional context he has not yet fully analyzed. I 
want here to extrapolate from Cavell’s work a critical, yet sympathetic, 
response to the university that I think is especially needed today, when 
the rise of the so-called corporate university is intensifying some of the 
professional pressures that Cavell resists.
Cavell’s discomfort with academic philosophy stems in part from what 
he regards as its narrowness, specifically, its marginalization of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and other philosophers, not to mention Henry David 
Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson, the comedies of remarriage, and 
other work that Cavell cares about. In his view, the professional mar-
ginalization of these writers partly results from their exemplifying what 
can seem to be a vague moral seriousness, even at times a prophetic 
urgency, that calls for something akin to conversion rather than issuing 
in specific conclusions or reforms. According to Cavell, academic phi-
losophy, by contrast, subsumes moral concerns under ethics, a separate 
field in which the “point of conversation is getting the other to agree 
to, or to do, something.”2 
Although Cavell does not systematically analyze the institutional 
pressures on academic philosophy, he does drop some hints. As befit-
ting a subject seeking legitimacy in the university, academic philosophy 
has aligned itself with teachable subjects such as science, as opposed 
to more elusive pursuits such as painting and creative writing, which 
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have been less at home in the university and where the necessity of 
university instruction may be less clear and the line between success and 
failure harder to draw.3 What can be taught in academic philosophy is 
a method of analysis, mastery of which can be certified in students by 
professors and in professors by journals, promotion and tenure com-
mittees, and administrators. Subdividing philosophy into discrete fields 
such as ethics makes it even more manageable, or less susceptible to 
sweeping pronouncements that cannot be tested by experts. Finally, the 
interest in getting “the other to agree to, or to do, something” associ-
ates academic philosophy, or at least ethics, with measurable results and 
maybe even progress. 
The rise of the so-called corporate university has exacerbated the 
emphasis on teachable expertise and definable outcomes that I have been 
describing. Take the largest private university in the United States—the 
University of Phoenix—as a model that some state and non-profit pri-
vate universities may be emulating as they struggle to cut costs, meet 
external expectations, and work with reduced budgets. At the University 
of Phoenix, the interest in measurable results gets recast as learning 
outcomes that teachers enable students to reach as efficiently as pos-
sible. Specialization narrows these learning outcomes to sharply defined 
skills, such as writing business memos, which students can master and 
build on. Finally, the emphasis on method does not simply depersonal-
ize instruction; it reduces the need for instructors. Each instructor is 
tasked with teaching as many students as possible, sometimes through 
distance learning, with class size reaching a limit only when the learning 
outcomes cannot be delivered. Lacking tenure, these instructors can be 
replaced, like interchangeable parts, when they wear out or their student 
customers become too dissatisfied with them. At another rapidly grow-
ing for-profit university, DeVry, students unhappy with their instructors 
are assured, in the words of a campus dean, that “weak links” will be 
“fixed” in a “total quality management” environment.4 
Along similar lines, Lindsay Waters has recently explored how “the 
corporate makeover of the university” and “the commercialization of 
higher education” have affected academic publishing.5 Universities 
compete in an increasingly cutthroat marketplace and face an escalating 
insistence on results from state legislatures, federal agencies, accrediting 
associations, and boards. Capitulating to this “accountability culture” 
(EP, p. 20), bottom-line driven administrators have stepped up demands 
for faculty productivity, measured in quantitative terms by numbers of 
students taught, grants won, and, what most concerns Waters, books and 
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articles published. These administrators have “outsourced” tenure and 
promotion decisions to journal editors and academic publishers, much 
like Ford buying batteries from Delcro (EP, p. 25). In Waters’ polemic, 
everyone is implicated in the loss of “any transcendental element” (EP, 
p. 11), any element of judgment or imagination, in the corporatist 
university: “greedy deans and provosts” (EP, p. 37); undiscriminating 
journal and university press editors who abandon standards “to keep 
the assembly-line moving” (EP, p. 22); librarians who fail to protect 
“book budgets from rapacious commercial presses who gouge them 
on journals” (EP, p. 37); and ambitious faculty members, “captains of 
academic industry” (EP, p. 67), who pursue star status instead of insti-
tutional change and who remain oblivious to the suffering of exploited 
adjuncts, like smug corporate CEOs insulated from their less well off 
employees (EP, p. 29).
I am not suggesting that academic philosophers are responsible for 
these tendencies or would endorse them. My point is that the remak-
ing of universities along corporate lines has exacerbated pressures that 
have long impinged on disciplines seeking university legitimacy. Some 
of these pressures result from universities being institutions with limited 
resources that will always have to set priorities and justify what they do. 
There is nothing new or even necessarily objectionable about calls for 
accountability, productivity, and efficiency. Universities should be inter-
ested in containing costs, assessing the effectiveness of their programs, 
and thinking through their choices. What is new and objectionable is 
reducing the goals of universities to immediate, quantifiable results.
The question remains, however, what are those of us in universities to 
do about these corporatist tendencies besides vent, like Waters, or give 
in, like the DeVry dean? For some guidance, I want to return to Cavell’s 
dissatisfaction with academic philosophy. Cavell does not categorically 
reject academic philosophy. Instead, he recognizes it as “the genuine 
present of the impulse and the history of philosophy, so far as that pres-
ent takes its place in our (English-speaking) public intellectual life” (TS, 
p. 32). As a writer, he wants neither to bypass academic philosophers 
as an audience nor limit his writing to their models. He admits to a 
“career-long wish” for his work “to be answerable to professional phi-
losophy.”6 Cavell’s accountability to professional philosophy has puzzled 
some of his readers, among them Richard Rorty, who detect in Cavell 
an institutional timidity at odds with the boldness of his preference for 
Thoreau and other writers. As Cavell paraphrases Rorty’s concern, “to 
go on to worry whether certain of the texts I promote are philosophy 
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or are something else (say literature) is unnecessary; or rather, it is 
something deans worry about.” Cavell responds,
Would it have helped to add that what I care about in a work is what the 
work shows itself to be, to let happen, to care about, and that this is not 
something that can be known by how a dean, or anyone else, decides to 
classify texts and thereupon to invest in them?7
The works that interest Cavell show themselves to be steeped in philo-
sophical issues (such as skepticism), committed to philosophical goals 
(such as liberation from false necessities), and capable of philosophical 
rigor in their thinking and writing.8 By calling these works “philosophi-
cal,” Cavell is claiming that they reward a deep level of attentiveness 
and seriousness in our approach to them. Instead of giving up on aca-
demic philosophy, he wants these works to put pressure on it, and for 
him that means continuing to call them “philosophical” and persisting 
in writing “at once inside the profession of philosophy and outside” 
(PDAT, p. 193).
Potentially even more worrisome to a dean, Cavell has long wondered 
not just whether the writing that he most values belongs in philosophy 
or literature departments but whether it is teachable at all. The limits 
of instruction, the inability of teachers to guarantee the effectiveness of 
their teaching, is a major moment in all the writers that interest Cavell, 
expressed sometimes from the point of view of a student (for example, 
Emerson’s remark in his “Divinity School Address” that “truly speaking, 
it is not instruction, but provocation, that I can receive from another 
soul”)9 and sometimes from the point of a view of a teacher, as in 
Wittgenstein’s Investigations #217: “If I have exhausted the justifications 
I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to 
say: ‘This is simply what I do’” (quoted in CHU, p. 70). In wanting their 
work to be taken up and continued voluntarily, in wishing to prevent 
understanding which is unaccompanied by profound inner change, in 
thus asking so much of their readers, including trust and an openness 
to uncertainty, self-doubt, and self-scrutiny, Emerson and Wittgenstein 
admit that the effectiveness of their teaching depends on the always 
unpredictable consent of their students or readers.10 Although this con-
sent can be provoked, it cannot be forced, taken for granted, or reduced 
to routine without violating the autonomy that it depends on. In The 
Claim of Reason, after noting the lack of impact made by Wittgenstein 
and Austin on academic philosophical culture, Cavell adds, “I do not 
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say that this is a bad thing”11—that is, a thing that can be moralized or 
easily fixed. Later, in This New Yet Unapproachable America, after making 
a similar point about the “insufficient” reception of Wittgenstein by 
professional philosophy, Cavell says, “I am not interested in expressing 
or assessing blame for this situation, either of those who may neglect 
the spiritual fervor [of Wittgenstein] as philosophically impertinent or 
of those who may insist on the fervor impertinently” (NYUA, p. 30). It 
is an open question for Cavell “whether the soul’s journey is any part of 
a university’s business, hence to what extent, if it is an essential part of 
philosophy’s business, philosophy is left out of the university,” or should 
be (CHU, p. 32). In short, he is not sure “whether any sky remains a 
canopy for philosophy” (NYUA, p. 8).
Even as Cavell refuses to demonize academic philosophy or philoso-
phers, he often expresses his gratitude to the universities that he has been 
associated with—to the intellectual community he enjoyed at Berkeley, 
to teachers like J. L. Austin, to colleagues and students, to the teaching 
fellows of a particular course (Cities of Words, a book, he says, “that was 
born in a classroom” [CW, p. 163] is dedicated to the teaching fellows 
in Moral Reasoning 34). In an early essay on film in the university, he 
asks, playfully paraphrasing Marx,
Isn’t a university the place in our culture that enables us now to teach one 
thing today and learn another tomorrow, to hunt for time to write in the 
morning, fish for a free projector in the afternoon, try to raise money for 
projects in the evening, and after a seminar read criticism? To some this 
will not seem a Utopian set of activities, but in the meantime, and for 
those with a taste for this particular disunity, why not have it?12 
As someone who has benefited from being in a university, he speaks 
with conflicting emotions of “gifted philosophical sensibilities deflected 
from pursuing their love of philosophy by their unwillingness or inca-
pacity to face institutionalized disapproval” (NYUA, p. 6). Although he 
empathizes with their isolation, he never romanticizes it. He notes “how 
one grows weary of oneself with only oneself for conversation; and one 
gets cranky as well as hoarse . . . . But the worst is that isolation causes 
uncreativeness and parochialism more often than it makes for anything 
better” (PH, p. 273–74). At any rate, despite his ongoing doubts about 
whether as a university professor in a philosophy department he is in 
the right place, he writes The Claim of Reason as “the record of one who 
stayed” (CR, p. xviii).
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I am interested here not in why Cavell has stayed but in what staying 
means. For one thing, staying, whether in academic philosophy or the 
university, means being fortunate enough to having gotten in. To bor-
row from Cavell’s analysis of moral perfectionism, having gotten in puts 
Cavell among the advantaged in our society—not the most advantaged, 
to be sure, but not the least, either. In Cavell’s case, or, I would argue, 
in the case of any tenured university professor (i.e., not just one with an 
endowed chair at Harvard), “advantaged” means working in an institu-
tion that permits a degree of autonomy, security, and critical thinking 
rarely found in other American workplaces.
For all their many benefits, however, universities are not perfect, the 
remaking of universities along corporate lines being only one example 
of ominous tendencies most of us would criticize. It would be easy to 
turn Cavell’s dissatisfaction with academic philosophy into a wholesale 
indictment of a spineless profession that has curried institutional favor 
by excluding what it most ought to value (I can imagine Waters tak-
ing this path). It would also be easy to fault Cavell for not making this 
indictment—for seeming to set aside his grievances and ignoring the 
injustices, omissions, and shortsightedness of the university environ-
ment that supports him. From this point of view, Cavell’s decision to 
stay, his consent to remaining a member of the academic profession, 
compromises him and nullifies the value of his work for those who are 
not so privileged or content.
Cavell not only understands the alienation and anger that fuel this 
critique; he shares them. One of his most frequently quoted comments 
is from Emerson’s “Self-Reliance,” “Every word they say chagrins us and 
we know not where to begin to set them right” (quoted in NYUA, p. 
69), which speaks of an intellectual isolation so deep that it could lead 
to despair and fuel dreams of escape. In Emerson, it does not, partly 
because he realizes that some measure of isolation—he calls it “poverty 
and solitude”—attends all serious philosophical work, wherever one 
undertakes it. Eschewing conformity, the scholar, in Emerson’s words, 
“takes the cross of making his own [road]” and with it “the self-accusation, 
the faint heart, the frequent uncertainty and loss of time, which are the 
nettles and tangling vines in the way of the self-relying and self-directed; 
and the state of virtual hostility in which he seems to stand to society, 
and especially to educated society.”13 Neither Emerson nor Cavell can 
imagine a society or even a relationship where these feelings will once 
and for all way give way to acceptance, recognition, and unconditional 
support. As Cavell puts it, some measure of misunderstanding and social 
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rejection is “a characteristic fate of philosophy, at least in any somewhat 
novel form” (CW, p. 163).
Acknowledging the inevitability of rejection and neglect tempers our 
search for community and may incline us to concede, however begrudg-
ingly, that the place we inhabit—in this case, the university—is good 
enough: maybe not perfect but better than any conceivable alternative, 
especially when we take into account, as Cavell does, the costs of more 
radical forms of isolation, such as bitterly leaving the academic profession 
or sadly not getting in. This acceptance of the university as the best place 
we can find (for now) is hardly a ringing endorsement and can lead to 
various strategies for adapting to an environment one cannot flee or 
change, a place where, in Cavell’s words, our consent “can neither be 
given nor withdrawn” (CW, p. 198). These adaptive responses include 
silent melancholy, quiet desperation, indifference, cynicism, aloofness, 
or adopting what Cavell calls, following Emerson, the “forced false smile 
of conformity” (CHU, p. 28), pasted on to survive conversations that 
do not interest us and situations where we do not feel at home. All of 
these help us survive a world where we feel stuck, invisible, lost, power-
less to make ourselves intelligible to others, let alone influence them, 
and uncomfortably aware that our privileges may be somehow bound 
up with the sufferings of others but not sure where our responsibilities 
lie or how we can carry them out. 
For Cavell, inheriting the writing of Emerson, Wittgenstein, and 
others, going on with it in our own often dark time, means above all 
showing us how to withstand moral cynicism, or how to respond to the 
inevitable failures of our institutions—universities included—and our 
complicity with them, “otherwise than by excuse or withdrawal” (CHU, 
p. 18). I think a key move on his part is to shift our attention from 
persuading or defeating the scoundrels in our lives, which can seem 
futile, to releasing the good in ourselves and in others, as Austin did 
for him (Cavell says he owes Austin “whatever is owed the teacher who 
shows one a way to do relevantly and fruitfully the thing one had almost 
given up hope of doing”).14 As Cavell puts it, “a philosopher will natu-
rally think that the other has to be argued out of his position, which is 
apt to seem hopeless. But suppose the issue is not to win an argument 
. . . but to manifest for the other another way . . . a shift in direction, 
as slight as a degree of the compass, but down the road making all the 
difference in the world” (CHU, p. 31). Cavell’s ongoing quarrel with 
academic philosophy becomes what Emerson might call an aversive 
conversation with what, for all Cavell knows, may be an implacable 
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force but a conversation which other individuals may pick up on and 
sustain because it represents a shift in direction they also are wishing to 
take. By continuing his conversation with academic philosophy without 
any guarantee of institutional impact, by exemplifying another way of 
doing philosophy, Cavell is acting on the hope that some individuals 
somewhere will find in his words their own repressed thoughts returned 
to them and be encouraged to continue. The force of his words lies 
in their power not to compel agreement but to attract, provoke, or 
awaken the interest of individual readers. The individuals touched by 
Cavell may still find themselves incomprehensible and isolated in their 
immediate institutional surroundings, yet they have found in Cavell’s 
writing a reprieve from their disillusionment and the stirrings of a new 
kind of intellectual community—not “the overcoming of [their] isola-
tion, but the sharing of that isolation.”15 For these readers, Cavell has 
filled the role that moral perfectionism assigns the friend, or someone 
“whose conviction in one’s moral intelligibility draws one to discover 
it, to find words and deeds in which to express it, in which to enter the 
conversation of justice” (CHU, p. xxxii).
Cavell decides to stay rather than withdraw; in choosing to stay, he 
accepts his membership in an admittedly flawed institution. With that 
membership, however, comes many responsibilities, among them tak-
ing an interest in what happens to you and others; being sociable (as 
opposed to disengaged); participating; staying open to personal change 
and self-criticism; listening; remaining endlessly responsive to differ-
ence; engaging in meet and happy conversations with those around 
us (adapting Milton, Cavell notes that “a certain happiness, anyway a 
certain spirited and orderly participation, is owed to the commonwealth 
by those who have sworn allegiance to it” [CHU, p. 105]). In stressing 
these responsibilities, Cavell is reaffirming that “I owe to my society a 
meet and cheerful exchange to reaffirm my consent, or a else a willing-
ness to articulate the public causes of my unhappiness. That there is 
no measurable limit to my responsibility for the way things are, or to 
how far the effect of my unhappiness mars the possibility of the gen-
eral happiness, hence brings into question the fact of our communal 
existence” (CW, p. 68)—brings it into question by suggesting that it 
leaves someone out. “Meet and cheerful” here mean not “bubbly and 
happy”—remember, we have wiped off the fake smile of conformity—but 
“spirited,” which in turn means engaging in exchanges rather than dia-
tribes or one-sided attacks, exchanges where we seek to learn as well as 
demonstrate something. 
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Just as Cavell is not retreating in silent melancholy within or outside 
the university, neither is he declaring immediate or even eventual victory. 
There is no guarantee that things will get any better: hence the need 
for ceaseless responsiveness and “eternal vigilance” (CHU, p. 125). Fol-
lowing Emerson, Cavell is continually counseling patience, persistence, 
waiting, resourcefulness, improvisation, hope, in the face of discouraging 
odds and the inevitability of disappointment. He is asking us to conduct 
our work with “an attitude to our pursuits that is precisely unimposable 
and unrewardable” (CHU, p. 10): unimposable, because it cannot be 
forced on ourselves or on others but has to come from within each of 
us; unrewardable, because it finds fulfillment in every step of the way, 
not in some ultimate pay off or triumph that may never materialize.
The uncertainty of success returns me to what I earlier called the 
limits of teaching, or those moments when, as Wittgenstein describes 
them, justifications come to an end and “my spade is turned.” At these 
times, I feel I have done everything, or at least enough, to make myself 
clear. Adding to what I have already said is not getting me anywhere—in 
advancing my own understanding, in spurring on my apparently stalled 
students. It is time now for my students to respond, not just to regur-
gitate what they have heard but to go on with it, on their own, maybe 
in a direction that I cannot anticipate. These are the anxious moments 
that the remaking of education along corporate lines seeks to minimize 
by limiting instruction to the most manageable tasks and installing 
mechanical check points along the way, such as annual standardized 
tests in American high schools, which sustain the illusion of lock step 
progress from level to level. 
Cavell, by contrast, does not evade the unpredictability of teaching but 
values it. Again, in the scene of instruction depicted by Wittgenstein, after 
I have said everything I can, “Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply 
what I do.’” Commentators like Saul Kripke have treated “this is simply 
what I do” as resolving the teacher’s dilemma along the lines of saying 
to the student, “take it or leave it,” or, as Cavell paraphrases Kripke’s 
reading, “after I have done everything to guide you, I am licensed to say, 
‘do it my way or suffer the consequences,’” with “licensed” carrying the 
full weight of institutional authority. Cavell, however, takes “this is simply 
what I do” as something that the teacher is only inclined to say, maybe 
in the authoritarian, frustrated tone heard by Kripke but maybe in a 
more passive or personal way: a teacher confessing what he or she does 
without invoking any institutional authority, admitting to the student “‘I 
cannot see here where or how to make myself plainer, but here I am, 
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doing what I do, whenever you find you are interested again” (PDAT, 
p. 204). Waiting like this, giving the student time, means accepting the 
right of others to contest what I say, to teach me. It means “letting my 
confidence be challenged, anyway become hesitant in, thoughtful about, 
expressing itself” (CHU, p. 76), not assuming or mandating concurrence 
but asking myself “how important it is that we agree, and how thoroughly, 
in various strains of our form or forms of life, and where we may, or 
can, or ought to, or must, tolerate differences, even perhaps be drawn 
to change our lives—or suffer the consequences” (PDAT, p. 204).
What some academic philosophers regard as the most annoying fea-
tures of Cavell’s writing turn out to exemplify the pedagogical values I 
have been describing. The confidence “hesitant in, thoughtful about, 
expressing itself” informs seemingly endless sentences that circle back 
on themselves, qualifying their key points and setting in motion possible 
further revision. Acknowledging that “this is simply what I do” amplifies 
Cavell’s personal voice in his writing, by which I mean his references 
to his own earlier work, his promissory notes to himself on topics that 
one day he hopes to pursue, and his careful tracking of where he stands 
and how he feels (“I come back to earth,” “I feel like saying,” and so 
on). Inviting readers to continue his thinking leads to essays that often 
end in open-ended questions or in provisional statements that function 
more as gathering places than as final destinations, as if he is not only 
summing up what he has said but encouraging further work on the 
part of the reader. The overall point of the essay admittedly may seem 
vague, though only when measured against calls for specific actions that 
Cavell neither precludes nor issues.
I am not suggesting that all teaching and writing must all the time 
be this tentative and exploratory. Patience has its limits, as does anger. 
Much as we can move too fast, we can wait too long in reaching conclu-
sions, making decisions, and taking a stand. My point is that the scene 
of instruction described by Cavell captures a possibility that universities 
ought to treasure rather than steamroll away in the name of narrowly 
defined efficiency and productivity. The humility represented in this 
scene validates the university as place where coercion gives way to con-
sent, judgments can be contested as well as made, and students and 
teachers can take their time, exchange places, reconsider where they 
are headed, and remain open to change, in themselves and in others. 
Staying in the university, continuing to teach and write, despite all 
the discouragements that come one’s way, all the problems one feels 
somehow responsible for but cannot solve, thus does mean granting 
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some legitimacy to the university. It means ratifying universities as places 
that remain, if not perfect, at least open to reform, conducive to aversive 
conversations, places where “happiness and liberty can be pursued and, 
to whatever extent such a thing is possible, preserved” (CW, p. 75). As 
Cavell observes, in one of his most explicit statements of support for the 
university and the academic freedom it should stand for, “I do not have 
to claim that everything is possible in every period in order to plead 
this much for universities: that while they may suffer every failing of the 
institutions of which they partake, they are unique among institutions 
in preserving the thought that nothing is the only game in town, or 
that if something is, then there are habitations outside the town where 
it is not. For that reason, before any other, they have, as they stand, if 
not my devotion, my loyalty” (PH, p. 274). Devotion here would imply 
uncritical allegiance; loyalty can, and sometime should, take the form 
of loyal opposition.
For some critics, I would imagine that claiming even this much for 
the openness of universities is conceding too much or settling for too 
little. The unhappiness of these individuals has reached a point where 
they feel diminished by continuing to stay or participate. In institutions 
like universities that depend so heavily on consent and engagement, it 
must always be an open question, subject to collective discussion and 
personal judgment, whether the evasions, injustices, and exclusions of 
universities have gone so far as to discredit them altogether. I do not 
feel that way, at least not now, however much those of us who have 
decided to stay must remain open to letting our confidence be tested. 
In any case, to paraphrase a comment by Cavell on Wittgenstein, this 
much seems to me true: imagine a university without Cavell’s writing 
and the voices he has encouraged. It is a place where our danger to 
one another grows faster than our help for one another.16
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culture depicted in the Investigations we are all teachers and all students—talkers, 
hearers, overhearers, hearsayers, believers, explainers; we learn and teach incessantly, 
483Michael Fischer
indiscriminately; we are all elders and all children, wanting a hearing, for our injustices, 
for our justices. Now imagine a world in which the voices of the interlocutors of the 
Investigations continue on, but in which there is no Wittgensteinian voice as their other. 
It a world in which our danger to one another grows fasters than our help for one 
another” (NYUA, p. 75). The kind of university that I have been affirming resembles 
the culture described here.
